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Abstract
We characterize the optimal selling mechanism in a scenario where similar goods are sold to
“high end” buyers through a posted price and to “lower end” buyers through an auction. We
show that the optimal mechanism involves an auction which is a standard optimal auction
(Myerson (1981)) up to a critical type. Types above the critical type are pooled. Further, the
allocation probability jumps up at the critical type and is the maximal possible for the pooled
types. Therefore other than pooling at the top, the optimal mechanism allocates the object as
efficiently as in a standard optimal auction. We show that posted price selling followed by
auctions with a “temporary” buy-now option implements the optimal mechanism. Auctions
with such an option are in widespread use on eBay.
KEYWORDS: Optimal Auction, eBay Auctions, Buy-Now Option, Posted Price, Price Discrimi-
nation
JEL CLASSIFICATION: D44
1 INTRODUCTION
Low transactions cost of trading on the Internet has led to a tremendous growth in the
scope of auctions. Moreover, the advent of listing sites such as eBay and Yahoo! have
made it very easy to sell an item through an auction and provide access to a large pool
of buyers. Initially, most of the goods sold through online auctions were collectables(1).
Increasingly, however, goods traditionally sold at posted prices (through bricks-and-
mortar stores and web sites) are being offered also through online auctions. A large
part of the standard goods sold through auctions are overstock items from wholesalers
and standard retailers. Overstock.com, which describes itself as “an Internet leader for
name-brands at clearance prices,” sells items through both posted prices and auctions.
IBM has launched its own eBay auctions to sell discontinued products(2). Other com-
panies such as Dell, HP, Gateway, and Sears, who have well established posted price
sales channels, have opened up eBay stores to sell overstock items and refurbished
systems through auctions(3).
These auctions allow sellers to sell to customers with values not high enough to buy
at the prices posted at stores. In this paper we focus on the role of online auctions
for sellers who use such auctions in addition to the traditional sales channels, allowing
them to expand their market base to customers with lower values(4). Our objective is to
characterize the optimal sales mechanism in such environments. However, the theory
we develop applies more generally to the study of optimal price discrimination across
different types of buyers using different venues.
Specifically, we study a scenario in which goods are sold to “high end” buyers through
a posted price and to “lower end” buyers through an auction. An important insight
emerging from our analysis is that the optimal design results in second degree price
discrimination across individual mechanisms, and therefore individual components of
the overall optimal mechanism may seem suboptimal if considered in isolation. As
(1)See Lucking-Reiley (2000).
(2)www.channeladvisor.com/downloads/IBM_public.pdf
(3)Also see Miller (2005) for a variety of examples.
(4)A useful interpretation might be that traditionally a seller could only reach the “high end” of the
market; subsequent innovation in marketing technology (e.g. the possibility of selling over the Internet)
makes it possible for the seller to reach the lower segment of the market as well.
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we discuss later, our analysis also provides a novel theoretical justification for auctions
with buy now options by showing that they form part of the optimal selling mecha-
nism(5).
To capture the environment discussed above, we model the demand for an item as
follows: with probability µ a buyer has valuation vh for the item, an event that can
be interpreted as the “high end” of the market. With probability (1 − µ) the buyer
can have a range of possible valuations all of which are less than vh. More concretely,
with probability (1 − µ) the buyer’s valuation is drawn from the interval [v, v] and
we suppose that the high value vh > v. We make the standard assumption that a
buyer’s valuation is private information. Given this environment, we ask what the
optimal selling strategy for the seller is and use techniques from the mechanism design
literature to answer this question.
The presence of an atom at vh implies, unsurprisingly, that the optimal mechanism
involves a posted price. Indeedwe need this feature since we want our model to match
up with the observed fact that the goods sold through online auctions are also sold (in
other venues) through a posted price method. Assuming an atom at vh is the simplest
way to ensure that the optimal mechanism involves a posted price, and allows us to
study the design of the optimal auction in the presence of such a price(6). The level of
the posted price is, of course, determined endogenously.
Let F(v) denote the cumulative distribution function of buyer valuations on the do-
main [v, v]. We show that the optimal mechanism has non-standard features even un-
der standard assumptions about the distribution F(v). Specifically, types above a cut-
off must be pooled. Such pooling “at the top” contrasts with an optimal auction in the
standard setting, which can admit pooling anywhere except at the top. The intuition is
that the high-end type vh can choose to participate in the auction rather than buy at the
posted price, leaving the seller to solve a second-degree price discrimination problem.
(5)The literature typically describes environments where such auctions are superior to standard auc-
tions. As far as we know, we are the first to show that these auctions can arise as part of the optimal
mechanism in certain environments.
(6)An alternative model would be to assume that there is also a high end distribution over some in-
terval [vh, vh + M], with M > 0, and then restrict the seller to choosing a posted price to serve this end
of the market (perhaps because running auctions in shopping malls is very costly). This would simply
add to algebra without adding to the results.
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Satisfying the incentive constraint of the high type requires “downgrading” the abil-
ity of such a type to secure the object in an auction. The auction outcome is therefore
distorted relative to standard auctions and our analysis shows that the ”best” way for
the seller to introduce this distortion is to have pooling at the top(7). (Without the atom
at vh, the standard optimal auction is inefficient only if there is a non-trivial reserve
price.)
As explained above, the pooling at the top is a device for price discrimination. Of
course, if vh or µ is very high, the optimal strategy for the seller is simply to sell only
to the high end buyers at a price vh and exclude the lower types. Whenever parameter
values are such that price discrimination is profitable, the price that can be extracted
from the high end buyers decreases in the probability of winning for a type in the
pooling region. Despite this, we show that for the pooled types, the optimal allocation
function takes the highest possible value. In other words, once the pooling cutoff is
determined optimally, any further transfer of the probability of allocation from pooling
types to types below is suboptimal. Therefore, beyond the pooling at the top, there is
no added inefficiency.
This “pooling at maximal value” feature of the optimal mechanism is very important.
As we explain below, it is precisely this feature that allows the mechanism to be linked
directly with observed selling procedures.
A puzzling non-standard feature of many online auctions is the availability of a “buy-
now” option. This is a posted price at which a bidder can buy the object immediately,
superseding the auction(8). In some cases (e.g. Yahoo!, Amazon, Overstock) the buy
price is available throughout the duration of the auction. However, the predominant
site eBay uses a format where the buy now option is temporary: it vanishes as soon as
the auction becomes active – i.e. a bid higher than the reserve price (but lower than the
buy price) is placed.
(7)Even though the intuition is clear when one considers the overall actions of the seller, we need to
emphasize that in the game that results from the optimal mechanism, in equilibrium, the types that show
up for the auctions lie in the interval [0, 1]. Hence to an observer studying the auctions only, the pooling
would appear puzzling and a direct refutation of well-known auction theory.
(8)This is called “Buy-It-Now” on eBay auctions, “Buy” price on Yahoo! auctions, “Take It” price on
Amazon auctions, “UBuy it” on uBid auctions and “Make it Mine” price on Overstock.com auctions.
Many smaller auctions also have such a buy-now feature.
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We show that a posted price followed by an auction with a buy now option implements
the optimal mechanism. In an online auction if at least one bidder exercises the buy
now option, the object is sold for sure at the buy price. The “pooling at maximal value”
feature of our optimal auction corresponds exactly to this feature. Moreover, in our
implementation scheme the buy price phase precedes the auction. Thus the buy now
option is temporary. Moreover, we show that in general it is not possible to implement
the optimal mechanism using a permanent buy now option. This contrasts with the
literature – discussed below –which focuses primarily on a permanent buy now option
and note (implicitly or explicitly) the suboptimality of a temporary buy now option in
their settings.
Of course, online auctions have a rich set of institutional details, and we do not claim
to capture all of them. Our principal objective is to point out that many online auc-
tions act as an addition to pre-existing sales channels, and gaining a proper under-
standing of these auctions requires considering the overall sales strategy. Indeed, a
phenomenon such as an auction with a temporary maximum price might seem very
puzzling viewed in isolation, but such an auction might well form part of an optimal
overall sales mechanism.
RELATING TO THE LITERATURE
The (relatively small) literature on auctions with a buy now option usually takes the
auction format as given (this is often taken to be the English auction) and focuses on
cases under which revenue might increase if a buy now option is added. There is
no suggestion that an auction with such an option is an optimal arrangement in such
cases.
Our approach, in contrast, is to model the online pricing environment, and ask what
the optimal selling mechanism is. We derive the optimal mechanism and show that
implementing it involves selling through a posted price followed by an auction with
a “temporary” buy now option. Such auctions are in widespread use on eBay. As far
as we are aware, ours is the first attempt to explain an auction with a buy now option
as part of an optimal response to the online pricing environment. Our approach also
generates different testable implications compared to the literature. We discuss this
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further in the conclusion.
An early contribution to the literature is by Budish and Takeyama (2001). They pro-
vide a simple example with discrete values to show that adding a maximum price to
an English auction increases revenue if the bidders are risk averse. Others have subse-
quently investigated this idea in more general settings. Reynolds and Wooders (2004)
and Hidve´gi, Wang, and Whinston (2005) show that this result holds in a setting in
which bidders draw values from a continuous distribution. The latter paper as well as
Mathews and Katzman (2004) show that the result holds even with risk neutral buyers
if the seller is risk averse. However, auctions with a buy now option are not optimal in
the environments they model. With continuous distributions, and risk averse buyers,
Maskin and Riley (1984) characterize the optimal auction(9). They also show that even
if we limit attention to standard auctions, so long as either the bidders are risk averse
or the seller is risk averse, first price auctions are preferred to English auctions by the
seller(10). However, none of the papers that study buy-price English auctions under a
continuous distribution and risk averse bidders/seller compare such auctions with the
optimal auction in their setting, or even the first price auction(11). Therefore even with
risk averse bidders/seller, the reason for choosing a buy-price auction remains unclear.
Some authors have looked at auctions with a buy now option in the context of se-
quential auctions. Kirkegaard and Overgaard (2005) model a sequence of single-unit
auctions. Buyers have multi-unit demand and there are competing sellers. They show
that if only one seller is allowed to introduce a buy price, he would do so in earlier
auctions and increase own revenue compared to second price auctions without such
an option. They also show that if there is only one seller, he benefits by introducing a
buy price in later auctions. Hendricks, Onur, and Wiseman (2004) conduct a theoreti-
cal and empirical study of two auctions held in sequence. In a model with two possi-
ble values for bidders, they derive conditions under which the first seller can increase
revenue by using a buy now option. In our paper the optimal mechanism can be im-
plemented by an indirect mechanism which is sequential: the object is offered through
(9)See alsoMatthews (1983). The optimal auction is in fact quite complex, involving payments by some
losing bidders, and is very different from standard auctions with a buy-now option.
(10)Holt (1980) previously derived this result for the case of risk averse bidders and a risk neutral seller.
(11)Budish and Takeyama (2001) show that with a discrete value distribution (two possible values), an
English auction with a buy-now option can raise more revenue than a first price auction.
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a posted price first, and then through an auction with a buy now option. However, the
auction itself is static rather than sequential.
Milgrom (2004) considers a model with sequential entry of bidders who face a cost of
learning their own type. A bidder who wants to buy at a (permanent) buy price wins
only if no other bidder in a higher queue position exercises this right. Bidders do not
know own queue positions, and consider all positions equally likely. In this setting
types above a certain cutoff have an incentive to buy at the buy price, and the revenue
maximizing auction involves a buy price. Our model, in contrast, is much closer to the
standard private values model so that entry is simultaneous, and there is no cost of
learning own value. The only departure from the standard model is the presence of an
atom at vh.
A further difference between the literature and our approach is the treatment of a tem-
porary buy now option. Such an option is seemingly even more puzzling (compared
to a permanent buy now option) in the sense that even if one could find a reason for
introducing a buy now option, taking it away as the auction starts begs a further ques-
tion. Indeed, the literature has noted that in the standard independent private values
setting (with risk-neutral seller and bidders), while an auction involving a suitably cho-
sen permanent buy price is revenue equivalent to an English auction (and therefore an
optimal auction), an auction with a temporary buy price seems not to be optimal. Both
Reynolds and Wooders (2004) and Hidve´gi, Wang, and Whinston (2005) conclude that
auctions with a temporary buy now option are revenue inferior to those with a per-
manent buy now option. The same conclusion applies to the sequential costly entry
model of Milgrom (2004). In contrast, our analysis shows that posted price selling fol-
lowed by a standard auction with a temporary buy now option – used widely by eBay
– implements the optimal mechanism.
Our results also relate to the literature on optimal auctions. In a standard private value
setting the bidders draw values from a continuous distribution over some interval
[v, v]. As Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981) show, so long as the vir-
tual value is increasing, the revenue maximizing auction allocates the object efficiently.
If the virtual value is not increasing over some interval, types over that interval are
pooled. However, for values close to v the virtual value is always increasing so that
there is never any pooling “at the top.” Our model departs from the standard setting
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since there is an atom at a value vh higher than v. In all other respects it coincides
with the standard model. We assume that a modified version of the virtual value is
increasing, so that the usual reason for pooling is eliminated. However, the addition
of an atom at a high value generates pooling for types close to v. The intuition for
this kind of pooling - impossible in the standard setting - is as follows. If the auction
that serves types [v, v] is exactly like a standard optimal auction, the high type vh pays
no more than type v. But pooling at the top makes it possible to extract a higher pay-
ment from this type. We show that the optimal mechanism involves a posted price (the
price charged to type vh) and an auction with pooling at the top at the maximal pos-
sible value, and then show that this type of pooling implies precisely that the optimal
mechanism involves an auction with a buy price.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
formulates and solves for the optimal direct mechanism. Section 4 shows that the
optimal mechanism can be implemented by a combination of a posted price and an
auction with a temporary buy now option, and also that in general it is not possible
to implement the optimal mechanism using a permanent buy now option. Section 5
concludes.
2 THE MODEL
An object is offered for sale by a risk neutral seller with reservation utility zero. There
are two potential risk neutral buyers. The buyers are ex ante symmetric and draw
values independently from the following distribution. With probability µ a buyer has
valuation vh. With probability (1− µ) a buyer has valuation drawn from the distribu-
tion F(v) with support [0, 1]. Assume vh > 1.
We assume F(v) has continuous density f (v), where f (v) > 0 for all v ∈ [0, 1], and that
F(v) satisfies the monotone hazard rate. In other words, other than the atom at vh, the
rest of the model is essentially the standard independent private values model(12).
(12)We could, for the sake of generality, write the type space as [v, v] ∪ {vh} with the stipulation that
vh > v. However, since we allow the seller to have a non-trivial reserve price in the mechanism in any
case, there is no gain in allowing v to be less than 0 (the seller’s valuation). Further, as will be clear
later, it is not important for the theoretical analysis to explore the so-called ”gap” and the ”no gap” case.
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3 THE OPTIMAL MECHANISM
3.1 FORMULATING THE SELLER’S OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
The seller is the mechanism designer. Without loss of generality, we restrict attention
to direct mechanisms. Let (r1, r2) denote a profile of reported values, where ri ∈ [0, 1]∪
{vh} for all i ∈ {1, 2}.
For any (ri, rj), the direct mechanism specifies a vector (ti(ri, rj), xi(ri, rj)) for all i, j ∈
{1, 2}, i 6= j, where ti(·, ·) is the transfer from buyer i to the seller, and xi(·, ·) is the
probability that i wins the object. Later, we focus on symmetric mechanisms, and the
convention followed throughout is that the first entry of x(ri, rj) and t(ri , rj) refer to
one’s own report.
Let Xi(ri) denote the expected probability with which i wins the item conditional on
reporting ri, and Ti(ri), the expected transfer conditional on reporting ri. The expec-
tation is with respect to the other buyer’s valuation distribution; in other words, as is
standard, buyer i assumes that buyer j is reporting truthfully and the mechanism is
incentive compatible when buyer i wants to report truthfully as well.
Since the seller is risk neutral and the buyers are ex ante symmetric, we can, without
any loss of generality, restrict the search for the optimal mechanism by considering
symmetric mechanisms only. In what follows, we drop the subscripts in the functions
Ti(·) and Xi(·).
The seller’s task consists of finding the optimal X(·) and T(·) subject to the incentive
compatibility and the individual rationality constraints. As is well known this can be
transformed into a problem of finding the optimal X(·). We now proceed to derive this
problem.
A bidder of type v chooses r to maximize U(v, r) = vX(r) − T(r). Satisfying the in-
centive compatibility constraint implies that the maximum occurs at r = v. Following
standard arguments it is easy to verify that incentive compatibility requires X(·) to be
non-decreasing(13).
Therefore, in order to not carry extra notation, we use the unit interval instead of [v, v].
(13)Consider two possible values v and v′ of a bidder. Incentive compatibility requires vX(v) −
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It is convenient to consider types v ∈ [0, 1] and type vh separately. From the envelope
theorem(14) we have,
U(v) = U(0) +
∫ v
0
X(t) dt (3.1)
Putting U(0) = 0, we get,
T(v) = vX(v) −
∫ v
0
X(t) dt (3.2)
Next, consider type vh. The highest payoff this type can get by reporting falsely is
maxv∈[0,1] (vhX(v)− T(v)).
For any v′, v′′ ∈ [0, 1] with v′ > v′′. We have,[
vhX(v
′)− T(v′)
]
−
[
vhX(v
′′)− T(v′′)
]
= vh
[
X(v′)− X(v′′)
]
− v′X(v′) + v′′X(v′′) +
∫ v′
v′′
X(t)dt
> vh
[
X(v′)− X(v′′)
]
− v′X(v′) + v′′X(v′′) +
(
v′ − v′′
)
X(v′′)
=
[
vh − v
′
] [
X(v′)− X(v′′)
]
> 0
Where the first inequality follows from the fact that X(v) is non-decreasing in v and
the last inequality follows since in addition vh > v
′. Thus type vh gets a higher utility
by reporting a higher type. Therefore, without loss of generality, we can write,
max
v∈[0,1]
vhX(v)− T(v) = vhX(1)− T(1). (3.3)
It is clear that the IC constraint of type vh must bind at the optimal mechanism. Hence
we must have
vhX(vh)− T(vh) = max
v
vhX(v)− T(v) (3.4)
T(v) > vX(v′) − T(v′) and v′X(v′) − T(v′) > v′X(v) − T(v) Combining the inequalities we get
(v− v′) (X(v)− X(v′)) > 0. Therefore X(v) > X(v′) whenever v > v′.
(14)See Milgrom and Segal (2002). Even though our model does not fit exactly their framework since
our entire type space, [0, 1] ∪ vh is not a connected interval, it is clear that since vh is the highest type,
the optimal mechanism involves x(vh, v) = 1 and t(v, vh) = 0 for all v ∈ [0, 1]. Hence without loss of
generality we can consider X(v) = (1− µ)
∫ 1
0 x(v, v
′)dF(v′) and T(v) = (1− µ)
∫ 1
0 t(v, v
′)dF(v′) for all
v ∈ [0, 1]. We show later that X(v) is in fact differentiable almost everywhere for v ∈ [0, 1].
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Using equations (3.2)-(3.3), T(vh) is given by
T(vh) = vhX(vh)− vhX(1) + X(1)−
∫ 1
0
X(t) dt (3.5)
Denote the seller’s expected revenue as ER. The seller’s per capita expected revenue,
ER
2 is given by
ER
2
= µT(vh) + (1− µ)
∫ 1
0
T(v) f (v)dv
Following standard procedure (see Myerson (1981)), we can write:∫ 1
0
T(v) f (v)dv =
∫ 1
0
(
v−
1− F(v)
f (v)
)
X(v) f (v)dv
Hence, the per capita expected revenue is given by
ER
2
= µ
(
vhX(vh)− (vh − 1)X(1)−
∫ 1
0
X(v)dv
)
+ (1− µ)
∫ 1
0
(
v−
1− F(v)
f (v)
)
X(v) f (v)dv
This can be further rewritten as:
ER
2
= µvhX(vh)− µ (vh − 1)X(1) +
∫ 1
0
ψ(v)X(v) f (v)dv (3.6)
where
ψ(v) ≡ (1− µ)
(
v−
1− F(v)
f (v)
)
−
µ
f (v)
(3.7)
We call ψ(v) the “modified virtual valuation” of type v.
As mentioned in the introduction, our main result shows that as long as the seller
is selling to some types in [0, 1], the optimal mechanism must involve pooling (type-
bunching) around 1. The most forceful way to show this is to make our environment
as close as possible to that under which standard auctions are optimal. In other words,
we want to rule out other reasons for pooling. We therefore assume the following.
Assumption 1 (Modified regularity) ψ(v) is increasing in v(15).
(15)Monotone hazard rate of F(v) ensures that the standard virtual valuation, i.e. v− 1−F(v)
f (v)
is increas-
ing in v. Here, this is no longer sufficient to ensure that the modified virtual valuation ψ(v) is increasing
in v. To get a sufficient condition that is independent of µ, we also need convexity of F(v) (satisfied by
distributions such as uniform and triangular). For other distributions this assumption holds if, along
with monotone hazard rate, µ is not too high.
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Next, if ψ(v) is always negative for v ∈ [0, 1], the seller’s problem is trivial: never allo-
cate to these types. To avoid this uninteresting case, the weakest possible assumption
is to ensure ψ(1) > 0 We assume
Assumption 2 (Non-trivial Optimal Mechanism)
µ
1−µ < f (1).
This ensures ψ(1) > 0 and hence by continuity that there is a range of values of v such
that ψ(v) > 0 for all v in that range(16).
Since there is no type higher than vh (i.e., there is no type who can obtain rent by
reporting vh), the seller should sell with probability 1 if at least one bidder announces
vh. Thus
X(vh) = (1− µ) +
µ
2
= 1−
µ
2
. (3.8)
Since this is a constant, we can ignore this term in maximizing the seller’s revenue
(given by (3.6)) exercise. This proves the following result.
Proposition 1 The optimal mechanism is the solution of the following problem
max
X(v)
− µ (vh − 1)X(1) +
∫ 1
0
ψ(v)X(v) f (v) dv
when X(v) is non-decreasing and where ψ(v) is given by equation (3.7) and the transfers T(v)
and T(vh) are given by equations (3.2) and (3.5) respectively.
Intuitively, the first term is the loss from having an auctionwhich allows types below vh
to participate. This generates a loss because a pure posted price mechanism can charge
vh, while the mechanism including an auction must charge a lower posted price to
satisfy incentive compatibility. The second term is the gain from including an auction.
Note that the form of the second term is similar to the corresponding expression in a
standard setting. However, the solution for X(·) does not coincide with the standard
solution because of the first term. This also clarifies the price discriminating role of
(16)However, this assumption, though necessary, is not sufficient for the seller to want to sell to types
other than vh. If µ is high, it is optimal for the seller to not price discriminate, and only sell to type vh.
The precise condition is derived in proposition 2 below.
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the auction: X(·) must be set so that we can separate the high type from the rest and
extract surplus optimally from both segments of the market.
Note that we have already imposed the condition that X(v) must satisfyU(0) = 0. The
condition is used following equation (3.1), which also shows that the solution to the
above problem satisfies individual rationality. To satisfy incentive compatibility, the
solution to the above problem must also satisfy monotonicity of X(v). The following
analysis takes this into account explicitly in deriving the optimal mechanism.
3.2 SOLVING THE SELLER’S OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
We now derive a set of results that characterize the optimal mechanism.
Note that for v close to zero, ψ(v) < 0. From assumptions 1 and 2 it follows that there
is a v∗ < 1 such that ψ(v∗) = 0.
Since ψ(v) < 0 for v < v∗, a simple inspection of the seller’s objective function shows
that the optimal mechanism must be characterized by
X(v) = 0 for any v ∈ [0, v∗). (3.9)
In other words, similar to standard auctions, the seller does not sell to types whose
(modified) virtual valuation is negative.
If µ is close to 1, it is clearly optimal to simply sell to type vh at price vh and not sell to
lower types at all. In other words, in this case a large information rent must be ceded to
type vh if the seller wants to sell to lower types and maintain incentive compatibility.
The next result clarifies the precise condition required for the optimal mechanism to
involve a positive probability of allocating to lower types.
Proposition 2 Let λ(v) ≡
∫ 1
v
ψ(t) f (t)dt − µ(vh − 1). The optimal mechanism involves
non trivial price discrimination only if λ(v∗) > 0. In other words, if λ(v∗) 6 0 the optimal
mechanism is simply a posted price of vh.
Proof. Using equation (3.9), the seller’s optimization problem can be rewritten as
max
X(v)
− µ (vh − 1)X(1) +
∫ 1
v∗
ψ(v)X(v) f (v) dv.
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Let us reduce X(v) for all v by ǫ. Themaximand increases by−ǫλ(v∗). Further, λ
′(v) =
−ψ(v) f (v) < 0 for v > v∗ and therefore λ(·) is maximized at v = v∗. Therefore if
λ(v∗) 6 0, λ(v) < 0 for all v > v∗. Therefore reducing X(v) increases the maximand
by a positive amount, and it is then optimal to set X(v) = 0 for all v. h
If λ(v∗) 6 0, the information rent type vh gets if the seller tries to reach the “lower end”
of the market as well is too high and it is better for the seller to sell to type vh only. In
what follows, we assume that the optimal design is non-trivial, i.e. λ(v∗) > 0.
The next result, which is one of our main results, shows that the optimal mechanism
must involve pooling for some neighborhood of 1.
Proposition 3 Let X∗(v) denote the optimal mechanism. There exists a v̂ < 1, such that
X∗(v) is constant for v ∈ [v̂, 1].
Proof. Let X˜(v) be incentive compatible, individually rational, and strictly increasing
for any neighborhood of 1 no matter how small. The following argument shows that
such a X˜(v) cannot be optimal.
Consider ε > 0, small, and define K(ε) as
K(ε) = E
[
X˜(v)|1− ε ≤ v ≤ 1
]
=
∫ 1
1−ε
X˜(v)
f (v)
1− F(1− ε)
dv
Note that because X˜(v) is strictly increasing, X˜(1− ε) < K(ε) < X˜(1).
Consider the following X(·):
X(v) =
X˜(v) for v ∈ [0, 1− ε)K(ε) for v ∈ [1− ε, 1]
X(v) is non-decreasing since X˜(v) is non-decreasing. In particular, X(v) must satisfy
the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints given that X˜(v) does.
Now, let
R˜ = − µ(vh − 1)X˜(1) +
∫ 1
0
X˜(v)ψ(v) f (v)dv
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and
R = −µ(vh − 1)X(1) +
∫ 1
0
X(v)ψ(v) f (v)dv.
We have,
R− R˜ =
[
X˜(1)− K(ε)
]
µ(vh − 1) + K(ε)
∫ 1
1−ε
ψ(v) f (v)dv −
∫ 1
1−ε
ψ(v)X˜(v) f (v)dv
>
[
X˜(1)− K(ε)
]
µ(vh − 1) + K(ε)
∫ 1
1−ε
ψ(v) f (v)dv − X˜(1)
∫ 1
1−ε
ψ(v) f (v)dv
=
[
X˜(1)− K(ε)
] [
µ(vh − 1)−
∫ 1
1−ε
ψ(v) f (v)dv
]
where the inequality follows since X˜(v) is strictly increasing. Now, for ε sufficiently
small but strictly positive both terms in the last line above is positive and hence R > R˜
which shows that X˜(v) cannot be optimal. It follows that any optimal mechanismmust
satisfy the condition in the statement of the proposition. h
Let v̂ denote the cutoff type such that all types above v̂ are pooled. Let K denote the
allocation probability of the pooled types. In other words, K = X(v) for v ∈ [v̂, 1].
Using this, as well as (3.9), the seller’s objective function can be rewritten as
max
X(v),K, v̂
K
[
−µ (vh − 1) +
∫ 1
v̂
ψ(v) f (v)dv
]
+
∫ v̂
v∗
X(v)ψ(v) f (v)dv (3.10)
The remaining task is to characterize K, v̂, and X(v) for v ∈ [v∗, v̂). Since the allocation
function can be discontinuous at v̂, we use K to representX(v̂) andwe letX(v̂−) denote
the left hand limit of X(v) at v̂. That is X(v̂−) ≡ limv↑v̂ X(v). We show below that the
optimal X(v) is discontinuous at v̂; furthermore the extent of the upward jump (ICC
implies that the jump cannot be downwards) is the maximal possible.
In order to derive the optimal mechanism it is useful to think directly in terms of the
actual allocation function x(v, v′) rather than the expected allocation function X(v). A
few observations are helpful. First, because of the pooling, the allocation of the object
over the entire interval [v∗, 1] is clearly inefficient. However, given the need to pool,
there is no further gain for the seller in making the allocation rule any less efficient
than it needs to be. Put differently, for a given v̂, the seller needs to determine how
to allocate the probabilities across the types in [v∗, v̂) and in [v̂, 1] but there is no gain
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in “wasting probabilities” (i.e., not selling with positive probability even if at least
one bidder’s type is greater than v∗), and there is no gain from having an inefficient
allocation rule if both bidders’ types lie in the interval [v∗, v̂). Hence, without loss of
generality, the optimal mechanism can be written as follows.
From equation (3.9), x(v, v′) = 0 for v < v∗. For v ∈ [v∗, v̂)
x(v, v′) =

1 if v′ 6 v
0 if v′ ∈ (v, v̂)
β(v) if v′ ∈ [v̂, 1]
For v ∈ [v̂, 1]
x(v, v′) =

1 if v′ < v∗
1− β(v′) if v′ ∈ [v∗, v̂)
1
2 if v
′ ∈ [v̂, 1]
where the function β(·) is to be determined as part of the seller’s optimization exercise.
From the above we can derive the expected allocation function X(·). Recall that types
in [0, 1] win only if there is no other bidder of type vh. Thus all terms in the expression
for X(v) contain a common factor (1− µ). For economy of expression, we keep this
common factor on the left hand side and derive the solution for X(v)/(1 − µ). The
allocation function described above implies the following expected allocation function:
X(v)
(1− µ)
=

0 if v < v∗
F(v) + β(v) (1− F(v̂)) if v ∈ [v∗, v̂)
F(v∗) +
∫ v̂
v∗
(1− β(t)) f (t) dt +
1− F(v̂)
2
if v ∈ [v̂, 1]
(3.11)
The next (and crucial) observation is that the function β(·) should optimally be such
that the allocation function for v > v∗ has only a single point of discontinuity, and
is flat beyond this point at the maximal height. Since the types above the point of
discontinuity are pooled, we refer to this as the “pooling cutoff.”
In other words, there exists a value of v, let’s call it vℓ, with vℓ ∈ [v∗, v̂) such that it is
optimal to set β(v) = 0 for v < vℓ, and for v ∈ [vℓ, 1) set β(v) such that X(v)/(1 − µ)
is flat at the highest feasible value.
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Now compare a mechanism with β(v) = 0 for all v with one in which β(v) > 0 for
some v and set optimally as described above. In the first case, the allocation function
X(v)/(1 − µ) equals F(v) up to v̂ and is flat beyond this point at the maximal height
(1 + F(v̂))/2. In the second case, the function equals F(v) up to vℓ and is flat beyond
this point at the maximal height (1+ F(vℓ))/2.
The only difference between the two is that the pooling cutoff is set at different points.
Thus the result simplifies the search for the optimal mechanism – the problem reduces
to simply finding the optimal pooling cutoff. Since we already introduced the notation
v̂ to denote a pooling cutoff, instead of introducing new notation to denote the optimal
cutoff, we simply denote it as v̂∗.
Before stating the result formally, let us explain the intuition behind it. In the following
discussion, for economy of expression let Y(v) ≡
X(v)
(1− µ)
.
Simplifying from (3.11), Y(v̂) is given by (1 + F(v̂))/2−
∫ v̂
v∗
β(v) f (v) dv. Suppose v̂
is fixed at some value, and Y(v̂) is fixed at K. For β(v) to be not equal to zero for all
v ∈ [v∗, v̂), we clearly need K < (1+ F(v̂))/2.
Given such a K, the seller must allocate (1+ F(v̂))/2−K to types in [v∗, v̂). What is the
best way of doing this? Given that ψ(v) is increasing, it pays to “pack the right side”
of the interval [v∗, v̂) as much as possible. Specifically, so long as some probability is
being transferred from the types above v̂ to types below, it is optimal for the seller to
transfer probability to the highest possible types below v̂. But to preserve incentive
compatibility it must be that Y(v) is non-decreasing and Y(v) 6 K for any v < v̂. This
puts an upper bound on β(v), which is the probability transferred to any type v < v̂.
Taking into account such constraints, the highest possible value of β(v) must be such
that Y(v) = K(17). We claimed before that Y(v) should be flat at this maximal height
beyond the cutoff point. To see why this is true, consider a small interval [v̂ − ε, v̂),
and suppose β(v) is such that Y(v) = K over this interval but is strictly less than K
everywhere else. Let vc > v∗ be such that β(v) = 0 for v 6 vc and β(v) > 0 for v > vc.
Now suppose we reduce β(v) to zero over a small interval [vc, vc + η], and transfer this
(17)Specifically, as can be seen from (3.11), the highest possible value of β(v) is given by β(v)(1 −
F(v̂)) = K− F(v).
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probability weight to an interval [v̂− ε− δ, v̂− ε] (this is possible since previously we
had Y(v) < K on this interval). This increases expected revenue. Indeed, this process
should go on until Y(v) can be raised to K over the latter interval. In this way we can
keep “packing” the right end of the interval [v∗, v̂), raising Y(v) to K for successively
lower intervals until we run out of the “probability budget” we started with. This gives
us a pooling cutoff vℓ such that (1+ F(vℓ))/2 = K.
1+F(v̂)
2
10
1
X(v)
(1− µ)
6
v -
F(v)
v∗ v̂
s
s
10
1
v -
F(v)
(1+ F(v̂))/2
K
v∗ vℓ v̂
s
s
s
Figure 1: In the left hand picture X(v)/(1− µ) = (1+ F(v̂))/2 for v > v̂, and therefore
β(·) = 0. In the picture on the right side, for v > v̂, X(v)/(1 − µ) = K where K <
(1+ F(v̂))/2. Thus β(v) > 0 for some v to the left of v̂. The optimal β(v) function for
v ∈ [v∗, v̂) is obtained by packing the right side until successively lower X(v) is pushed
up to K, as shown. This continues until vℓ such that (1 + F(vℓ))/2 = K. Note that
under the optimal β(·) function, the general form of the allocation function remains the
same as that in the picture on the left. Thus we only need to optimize with respect to
the pooling cutoff.
The upshot is that no matter what the value of K is, the form of the optimal allocation
function remains the same: Y(v) equals F(v) up to a cutoff point, and is flat at the
maximal height beyond the cutoff. Figure 1 shows the optimal Y(v) function.
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We state the result formally below. The formal proof requires an approximation argu-
ment and is somewhat lengthy. We have relegated this to the appendix.
Proposition 4 The optimal mechanism involves solving the following maximization problem
max
y
∫ y
v∗
F(v)ψ(v) f (v) dv +
1+ F(y)
2
[
−µ(vh − 1) +
∫ 1
y
ψ(v) f (v) dv
]
where the argmax gives the optimal pooling cutoff.
As mentioned before, we denote the optimal pooling cutoff as v̂∗. From the result
above it follows that v̂ ∗ is characterized implicitly by the equation:
ψ(v̂ ∗) =
1
1− F(v̂ ∗)
(
−µ(vh − 1) +
∫ 1
v̂ ∗
ψ(v) f (v) dv
)
(3.12)
The next result shows that v̂ ∗ exists and is unique.
Proposition 5 The optimal pooling cutoff v̂ ∗, implicitly defined by equation (3.12), exists and
is unique.
Proof. Define G(·) as follows.
G(v) ≡ (1− F(v)) ψ(v) + µ(vh − 1)−
∫ 1
v
ψ(t) f (t)dt
= (1− F(v)) ψ(v)− λ(v),
where λ(v) is defined in proposition 2. Note that G(·) is a continuous function. Fol-
lowing proposition 2, we assumed that λ(v∗) > 0 (to ensure a non-trivial price discrim-
ination problem). This, along with the fact that ψ(v∗) = 0, implies G(v∗) < 0. Further,
G(1) = µ(vh − 1) > 0. Hence there must exist v̂
∗ ∈ (v∗, 1) such that G(v̂ ∗) = 0.
Finally, dGdv = (1− F(v)) ψ
′(v) > 0. Hence v̂ ∗ is unique. h
From proposition 4, the general form of the mechanism can be rewritten as follows. As
before, the common term (1− µ) is placed on the left hand side.
X(v)
(1− µ)
=

0 if v < v∗
F(v) if v ∈ [v∗, v̂ ∗)
1+ F(v̂ ∗)
2
if v ∈ [v̂ ∗, 1]
(3.13)
where v̂ ∗ is given implicitly by equation (3.12).
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3.3 THE OPTIMAL MECHANISM
Finally, we collect together the results from above and describe the optimalmechanism.
This is given by the allocation function X∗(·) and the expected payment function T∗(·)
given by equations (3.14) to (3.17) below.
1+ F(v̂ ∗)
2
10
1
X(v)
(1− µ)
6
v -
F(v)
v∗ v̂
∗
t
t
Figure 2: The figure shows the optimal allocation function X∗(v)/(1− µ). The function
jumps up at the reserve cutoff v∗ and at the pooling cutoff v̂ ∗. The extent of the jump
at the pooling cutoff is maximal and given by (1+ F(v̂ ∗))/2− F(v̂ ∗) = (1− F(v̂ ∗))/2.
X∗(vh) = 1−
µ
2
, (3.14)
X∗(v) =

0 if v < v∗
(1− µ) F(v) if v ∈ [v∗, v̂
∗)
(1− µ)
1+ F(v̂ ∗)
2
if v ∈ [v̂ ∗, 1]
(3.15)
T∗(vh) = vhX
∗(vh)− (vh − 1)X
∗(1)−
∫ 1
0
X∗(t) dt, (3.16)
T∗(v) = vX∗(v)−
∫ v
0
X∗(t) dt for v ∈ [0, 1]. (3.17)
where the “reserve type” v∗ is given by ψ(v∗) = 0, and the “pooling cutoff” v̂ ∗ is given
by equation (3.12).
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X∗(vh) follows from equation (3.8), and T
∗(vh) follows from equation (3.5). The op-
timal allocation X∗(v) follows from equation (3.13). T∗(v) then follows from equa-
tion (3.2).
Figure 2 shows the optimal mechanism. There are two jump points, v∗ and v̂
∗, and the
rest of the mechanism is continuous (and differentiable).
Also note that other than the pooling of types in [v̂ ∗, 1] and the presence of the re-
serve type v∗, the optimal mechanism is efficient. In particular, whenever at least one
bidder draws a type above v∗, the object is sold with probability 1, and other than
the pooling region, the optimal auction coincides with the standard optimal auction
(Myerson (1981)).
The fact that the optimal mechanism is characterized by “pooling at the top at maximal
feasible value” implies that the auction includes a posted-price-like feature. Indeed, we
show in the next section this property translates into a temporary buy now option in
an auction. To explain the precise nature of such an option, and clarify the nature of
the optimal mechanism further, we explicitly construct an indirect selling mechanism
that implements the mechanism. However, before we do that we first present a simple
numerical example that compares the optimal mechanism both with a simple posted
price selling (only) and a mechanism that uses a posted price followed by a standard
auction. The latter comparison is particularly interesting since it gives an idea of the
(numerical) importance of the pooling feature of the optimal mechanism.
3.4 AN EXAMPLE
Suppose the bidders draw values from a uniform distribution over the unit interval.
Then F(v) = v, and f (v) = 1 for all v ∈ [0, 1]. From equation (3.7), the modified virtual
value is given by
ψ(v) = 2v(1− µ)− 1. (3.18)
The optimal mechanism is trivial if it involves a pure posted price of vh. In this case
the seller simply sells to the high type and does not sell to any other lower types. For
the optimal mechanism to involve selling to lower types as well, we need to satisfy
assumption 2, which requires µ <
1
2
. From proposition 2, we also need λ(v∗) > 0.
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Using the value of ψ(v) from above, this requires 4µ(1− µ)vh < 1. Solving for µ and
using the restriction µ < 1/2, we get the following constraint on µ which must be
satisfied for a non-trivial mechanism.
µ <
1
2
(
1−
√
vh − 1
vh
)
≡ µ(vh) (3.19)
Figure 3 shows this upper limit.
2 3 4 5
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
1
µ(v  )h
Pure posted price 
Posted price
plus optimal auction
µ
v
h
Figure 3: For any (µ, vh) to the left of µ(vh), the optimal mechanism is to have a posted
price plus an optimal auction, which itself includes a pooling region (which, as the next section
shows, implies an auction with a buy-now price). In the region to the right of µ(vh), the optimal
mechanism coincides with a pure posted price of vh.
For any µ < µ(vh), the optimal mechanism involves an auction. Under a uniform
distribution, the reserve type v∗ (given by ψ(v∗) = 0), and the “pooling cutoff” v̂ ∗
(given by equation (3.12)) are
v∗ =
1
2(1− µ)
v̂∗ = 1−
√
µ(vh − 1)
1− µ
From equation (3.6), the expected revenue is given by
ER = 2
[
µvhX
∗(vh)− µ (vh − 1)X
∗(1) +
∫ 1
0
ψ(v)X∗(v) f (v)dv
]
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where X∗(·) is specified in the previous section. For µ > µ(vh), the optimal mechanism
is a posted price of vh and the expected revenue is
(18)
ER = 2µvhX
∗(vh)
Finally consider a mechanism that combines a posted price with a standard auction.
This is clearly suboptimal(19), but calculating the expected revenue from this mecha-
nism clarifies the gain from the pooling at the top in the optimal auction. The expected
revenue from the suboptimal mechanism is given by
ER = 2
[
µvhX
∗(vh)− µ (vh − 1)X(1) +
∫ 1
0
ψ(v)X(v) f (v)dv
]
where X∗(vh) is as before, but now X(·) = (1− µ)F(v) for all v ∈ [v∗, 1].
As an example, consider vh = 1.5 and µ = .1. Since µ(1.5) = 0.21, the optimal mecha-
nism involves a posted price and an auction. The auction is characterized by v∗ = .56
and v̂∗ = .76, i.e. the lowest 56% types are not served and the top 24% types in the
unit interval are pooled. The revenue from the optimal mechanism is 0.47. A simple
posted price fetches a revenue of .29. Thus there is a gain from price discrimination.
The following figure shows the optimal mechanism.
 
 
 
 
.88
10
1
X(v)
(1− .1)
6
v -
v
.56 .76
s
s
Figure 4: The optimal allocation function X∗(v)/(1− µ) for µ = .1 and vh = 1.5.
(18)Alternatively, this can be derived as vh times the probability that at least one bidder is of type vh, i.e.
ER = (1− (1− µ)2)vh.
(19)Such an auction (with the right reserve price) is optimal in the standard independent private values
setting (i.e. without an atom at vh), but suboptimal in our setting.
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Figure 5 shows the expected revenue from the optimal mechanism for different values
of vh for µ = .1. For vh < 2.78, the optimal mechanism involves an auction, and the
dotted line shows the revenue if instead of the optimal mechanism, a pure posted price
of vh is used. The figure clarifies the revenue gain from price discrimination.
2.78 4
0.48
0.76
0.19
Posted price 
plus optimal auction
Pure posted price 
1
ER
vh
Figure 5: The expected revenue from the optimal mechanism for µ = .1 under different values
of vh. For vh < 2.78 the optimal mechanism involves a posted price as well as price discrimina-
tion through an auction, and generates more revenue compared to a simple posted price. For
higher values of vh the optimal mechanism coincides with a simple posted price of vh.
The following table now compares the expected revenue from the optimal mechanism
(ER Opt), posted price plus standard auction (ER Std), and a pure posted price mecha-
nism (ER PP) across different values of vh. The numbers reported are for µ = 0.1. The
table compares revenue for vh ∈ [1, 2.75]. For vh 6 2.75, µ(vh) > 0.1. Therefore over
this range of vh, the optimal mechanism involves non-trivial price discrimination, and
generates more revenue than a pure posted price mechanism. The table also shows
the gain from using the optimal mechanism compared to a mechanism that combines
a posted price with a standard auction. Finally, the table compares the values of the
optimal posted price (PP Opt) with the posted price if a standard auction is used (PP
Std). For either mechanism, the posted price is given by T(vh)/X(vh).
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vh ER Opt ER Std ER PP PP Opt PP Std
1 0.463 0.463 0.190 0.673 0.673
1.25 0.468 0.465 0.238 0.705 0.686
1.5 0.475 0.468 0.285 0.755 0.699
1.75 0.483 0.470 0.333 0.815 0.712
2 0.493 0.473 0.380 0.883 0.725
2.25 0.503 0.475 0.428 0.959 0.738
2.5 0.514 0.478 0.475 1.042 0.751
2.75 0.526 0.480 0.523 1.130 0.765
The following figure compares the expected revenue from the optimal mechanismwith
that from a mechanism that combines a posted price with a standard auction for µ =
0.1.
1.25 1.5 1.75 2 2.25 2.51 2.78
0.48
0.50
0.53
0.46
Posted price 
plus optimal auction
Posted price 
plus standard auction
1
ER
vh
Figure 6: The expected revenue from the optimal mechanism and a mechanism that combines
posted price with a standard auction for µ = 0.1. For this µ, the optimal mechanism involves an
auction for vh 6 2.78, beyond which the optimal mechanism is a pure posted price of vh.
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4 IMPLEMENTING THE OPTIMAL MECHANISM
In this section we discuss a selling mechanism (an “indirect” mechanism) that imple-
ments the optimal direct mechanism from the previous section. As we show below,
part of the mechanism is a posted price selling; the rest is an auction augmented by
some non-standard feature that we show to be a buy now option. In particular, we
show that an auction with a temporary – as opposed to permanent – buy now option
implements the optimal mechanism described in the previous section. We discuss this
point further after describing the selling mechanism.
4.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE SELLING MECHANISM
The selling mechanism is implemented in two stages.
Stage 1. (Posted Price) In stage 1, the item is offered for sale at a posted price P. If any
buyer wants to buy at that price, the item is sold and the game is over. If there is
a tie, it is resolved by randomly allocating the item to one of the tied buyers. If
the item is not sold in stage 1, we proceed to stage 2.
Stage 2. (Auction) Stage 2 is an auction augmented by a buy now option. Let B denote
the buy price. Stage 2 has two sub-stages.
First sub-stage. (Buy now option) In the first sub-stage, the auction opens with a buy
price B. If a single bidder bids B then the item is awarded to that bidder. If both
bidders submit B then the item is allocated randomly with the winning bidder
paying the price B. If no bidder bids the B price, the game proceeds to the second
sub-stage.
Second sub-stage. (Vickrey auction) The second sub-stage is a standard Vickrey auc-
tion with a reserve price. In this stage the item is allocated to the highest bidder
at a price which is the maximum of the reserve price and the second highest bid
provided the highest bid is above the reserve price. If the highest bid is below
the reserve price, the seller keeps the item and the game is over.
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We now show that this selling mechanism implements the optimal direct mechanism
from the previous section.
4.2 IMPLEMENTATION
To economize on notation, in what follows we refer to the optimal pooling cutoff, given
by equation (3.12), as v̂ (rather than v̂ ∗).
Proposition 6 The two stage sellingmechanism described above implements the optimal mech-
anism when the reserve price in the Vickrey auction is chosen as v∗, and the posted price P and
temporary buy price B are chosen as:
P = vh −
(
1− µ
1− µ/2
)[(
vh − F(v̂)
)(
1+ F(v̂)
2
)
+
∫ v̂
v∗
F(t) dt
]
(4.1)
B = v̂−
(
2
1+ F(v̂)
) ∫ v̂
v∗
F(t) dt (4.2)
where v∗ is given by ψ(v∗) = 0 and v̂ is given by equation (3.12).
The proof works in two steps. We first describe the equilibrium strategies and show
that if the buyers follow the prescribed strategies then the expected probabilities of
winning and the expected payments are exactly as in the optimal mechanism from
the last section. We then show that the described strategies do indeed constitute an
equilibrium of the selling mechanism.
Proof. STEP 1. Consider the following strategies: Type vh buys the item in stage 1
by paying the posted price P. Types in the interval [v̂, 1] submit the buy price B in the
first sub-stage of stage 2. Types in [v∗, v̂) submit their true valuations as bids in the
second sub-stage. (Types below v∗ do not win the item so it is irrelevant whether they
participate or not. Without loss of generality, assume they submit bids equal to their
valuations also.)
Given the strategies, type vh is the only type to buy at price P which means that if a
buyer of type vh follows the prescribed strategy, the expected probability of winning
the item is (1− µ) + µ2 which is exactly the same as X
∗(vh) (given by equation (3.14)).
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Using the values of X∗(vh) and X
∗(v) for v ∈ [0, 1], we get∫ 1
0
X∗(t) dt = (1− µ)
[∫ v̂
v∗
F(t) dt + (1− F(v̂))
(
1+ F(v̂)
2
)]
Substituting in equation (3.16),
T∗(vh) = vh
(
1−
µ
2
)
− (1− µ)
[(
vh − F(v̂)
)(
1+ F(v̂)
2
)
+
∫ v̂
v∗
F(t) dt
]
Hence, if the posted price P is given by equation (4.1), the expected payment of type vh
is the same in the indirect mechanism as it is in the optimal mechanism. For types in
[v∗, v̂), the probability of winning and expected payments are exactly as in the op-
timal mechanism (given by equation (3.15)) since they are simply taking part in a
Vickrey auction. The types in [v̂, 1] also have the same expected probability of win-
ning the item as in the optimal mechanism since if they all submit the buy price, they
are all being “pooled” in the indirect mechanism in exactly the same way they are
in the optimal direct mechanism and hence their expected probability of winning the
item in the indirect mechanism is (1− µ)
(
1+F(v̂)
2
)
. Now, the expected payment of
these pooled types in the optimal mechanism is given by v̂ X∗(v̂)−
∫ v̂
0
X∗(t) dt. Since∫ v̂
0
X∗(t) dt = (1− µ)
∫ v̂
v∗
F(t) dt, the expected payment of the pooled types can be
written as
(1− µ)
[
v̂
(
1+ F(v̂)
2
)
−
∫ v̂
v∗
F(t) dt
]
Conditional on reaching stage 2, if a type v ∈ [v̂, 1] bids B, the expected payment
is (1 + F(v̂)2 ) B, and hence this type’s overall expected payment from participating in
the mechanism is given by (1 − µ)(1+F(v̂)2 ) B. Hence if the buy price B is given by
equation (4.2), the expected payments are the same in the direct and the indirect mech-
anisms.
STEP 2. We now show the strategies described above do constitute an equilibrium.
From the way the payoffs are constructed, type vh is indifferent between buying at the
price P at the first stage and waiting to bid B in the second stage and strictly prefers
buying at price P to bidding any other price in the second sub-stage auction. Consider
now a type v ∈ [0, 1]. It is clear that no type v ∈ [0, 1]wants to mimic type vh ’s strategy
of buying the item in the first stage. To derive the optimal bid of a type v ∈ [0, 1] in the
second stage, all we need to do is to compare the type’s expected payoff from only two
27
possible bids: bidding the buy price B in the first sub-stage, or bidding the true value
of v in the Vickrey auction (in the second sub-stage).
Let D(v) denote the difference in expected surplus of type v from the bids B and v. The
proof now proceeds through the following lemma, which is proved in the appendix.
Lemma 1 D(v) is strictly increasing in v and D(v̂) = 0.
This shows that, as required, type v̂ is indeed indifferent between bidding B and v̂.
Further, since D′(v) > 0, types below v̂ strictly prefer to bid their true value rather
than B, and types v ∈ (v̂, 1] strictly prefer to bid B. h
4.3 PROPERTIES OF THE SELLING MECHANISM: A TEMPORARY BUY NOW OPTION
Wenow clarify that the indirectmechanismwhich implements the optimal direct mech-
anism includes a temporary buy now option. Later, in section 4.5 we point out the con-
nection between the temporary buy now option we use and the one used by eBay.
In stage 2 of the selling mechanism described in the previous (sub)section, bidders
are offered the chance to buy the item at price B, followed by a Vickrey auction. In
other words, the mechanism involves an auction but with a buy now option that is
only temporary - the option is withdrawn when the actual auction takes place. It is
interesting to note that under such a buy now option, the auction price can actually
exceed the buy price. To see this, note that types above v̂ plan to buy the item at buy
price B and types [v∗, v̂) follow the standard strategy of a Vickrey auction. Hence, at
the auction stage, the price range belongs to the interval [v∗, v̂] and since B < v̂ (see
equation (4.2)), once the buy now option vanishes, the subsequent auction price in the
optimal mechanism could be higher than the buy price.
Next, we show that in general it is not possible to implement the optimal direct mech-
anism using a permanent buy now option.
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4.4 SUBOPTIMALITY OF A PERMANENT BUY NOW OPTION
As noted in the introduction, the literature has focused mainly on augmenting stan-
dard auctions with a permanent buy price feature and has remarked that this generates
more revenue compared to a standard auction augmented a temporary by a temporary
buy-price auction. We show, on the other hand, that in general it is not possible to im-
plement our optimal mechanism with a permanent buy price.
Hidve´gi, Wang, and Whinston (2005) (henceforth HWW) provide a detailed analysis
of an English auction augmented by a permanent buy price b(20). We make use of
some of their results to show that in our context a permanent buy price is suboptimal.
HWW consider an independent private values setting with bidders drawing values
from a distribution on [v, v].
Result (HWW): Consider an English auction with a reserve price r and permanent
buy price b. In (the unique) equilibrium, there are cutoffs vc and vuc such that the type
space can be partitioned into the following (possibly empty) intervals:
• types v ∈ [r, b) use a “traditional strategy” : remain active till price rises to v,
• types v ∈ [b, vc) use a “threshold strategy” : remain active till the auction price
reaches a critical point t(v, b) and then jumps to the buy price b.
• types v ∈ [vc, vuc) use a “conditional strategy” : bid b if (and only if) the auctions
clocks moves from r (implying that there is at least one other bidder with value
above r), and
• types v ∈ [vuc, v] use an “unconditional strategy” : bid b right at the start of the
auction.
The threshold t(v, b) is decreasing in v, and if limv→v t(v, b) ≥ r, vc = vuc = v, and all
types v > b play the threshold strategy. On the other hand if limv→v t(v, b) < r, there
are types who play the conditional and unconditional strategies.
Translating this to our context, given a permanent buy price B and the reserve type
v∗, a posted price followed by an auction can implement the optimal mechanism if
(20)It should be noted that their basic environment is different from ours. They have a standard private-
value auction setting, and the distribution of values does not have a counterpart of the atom at vh that
features in our model. However, this distinction is not important for what follows.
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types [v̂, 1] play the conditional strategy (i.e. bid B immediately) and types [v∗, v̂) play
strategies such that their bids are revenue-equivalent to the bids in the temporary buy-
price auction.
It is clear that in the temporary buy-price auction (as in the optimal direct mechanism),
only types v ∈ [v̂, 1] are pooled, and there is no pooling in the interval [v∗, v̂). In this
interval the allocation probability and expected payment are strictly increasing. There-
fore if any indirect mechanism involves pooling (same allocation probability, same ex-
pected payment) in the latter region, this would introduce additional inefficiency, and
prevent the mechanism from implementing the optimal mechanism.
Consider an auction with a permanent buy price B. Types playing the conditional
strategy or unconditional strategy are clearly pooled. Therefore to avoid pooling of
types below v̂, it must be that that no sub-interval of types in [v∗, v̂) play either the
conditional or unconditional strategies. But from the result above, we know that this
happens if and only if limv→v̂ t(v, B) ≥ v∗. We state this below.
Corollary of the HWW result: A necessary condition for implementing the optimal
direct mechanism using a posted price combined with an English auction with a per-
manent buy price B is given by lim
v→v̂
t(v, B) > v∗.
Can we ensure this condition holds? As the following result shows, the problem is that
v̂, B as well as the function t(·, ·) are already determined by conditions of implemen-
tation of the optimal mechanism. Thus there is no parameter we could vary to ensure
this inequality holds. It might hold for some distribution F by lucky coincidence, but
in general it is not possible to ensure this. The proof of the following result shows that
the inequality is not satisfied for a uniform distribution.
For the following result, we use the usual definition of implementation: for any dis-
tribution F (satisfying the basic assumptions) an indirect mechanism implements the
optimal mechanism if there exists an equilibrium of the indirect mechanism whose
outcome is the same as that of the optimal mechanism. The following result shows
that the permanent buy now option fails this test.
Proposition 7 It is not possible to implement the optimal direct mechanism using an English
auction with a permanent buy price B.
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Proof. Since the indirect mechanism, by definition, is required to implement the op-
timal mechanism for all (allowable) possible parameter values and distributions, it
suffices to show an example where it does not. In particular, we show that under a
uniform distribution limt→v̂ t(v, B) < v∗ .
Note first that if a permanent buy-price auction implements the optimal mechanism,
then, given that the temporary buy-price auction does implement the optimal mecha-
nism as shown in the preceding subsection, all types should win with the same proba-
bility and get the same expected surplus in the two buy-price auctions.
Let us derive explicitly the threshold strategies of the types in [B, v̂).(21) In the tempo-
rary buy-price auction a type v ∈ [B, v̂) obtains a surplus
(v− v∗) F(v∗) +
∫ v
v∗
(v− y) f (y)dy
Under a permanent buy price, assuming, for the time being, that there is no pooling
sub-interval (i.e. the condition in the corollary is satisfied), expected surplus from fol-
lowing the threshold strategy is:
(v− v∗) F(v∗) +
∫ t(v,B)
v∗
(v− y) f (y)dy + (v− B) (F(v̂)− F(t(v, B))
Suppose now that F(.) is the uniform distribution. Equating the two expressions
above, we can solve for t(v, B) and obtain t(v, B) = 2B − v. Using the value of B
under the uniform distribution (from equation (4.2)), we have
lim
t→v̂
t(v, B)− v∗ = v̂−
2
1+ v̂
(
v̂ 2 − v 2∗
)
− v∗ =
(v̂− v∗) (1− v̂− 2v∗)
1+ v̂
Under a uniform distribution, v∗ (defined as ψ(v∗) = 0) is given by v∗ =
1
2(1− µ)
,
which finally gives us
lim
t→v̂
t(v, B)− v∗ =
(v̂− v∗)
(
1− v̂− 11−µ
)
1+ v̂
< 0
where the inequality follows from the fact that µ ∈ (0, 1). This violates the implemen-
tation condition in the corollary above. h
(21)Types v ∈ [v∗, B) play the standard Vickrey auction strategy and English auction strategy in the two
auctions so their probability of winning and expected surplus are the same in the two auctions.
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4.5 THE TEMPORARY BUY NOW OPTION USED BY EBAY
In the final part of this sectionwe discuss the relation between our temporary buy-price
auction and the one used by eBay.
In our indirect mechanism the seller makes an initial offer to sell the item at a pre-
specified price B but this buy price offer is temporary since it is withdrawn by the seller
if there are no takers. Therefore the buy now option is absent during the subsequent
auction. eBay uses a slightly different form of temporary buy now option. The chief
distinction is that in the eBay auction the disappearance of the buy price is endogenous:
the buy now option vanishes whenever a bidder places a bid above the reserve price.
Even though the eBay auction differs from ours, we now argue that in the scenario
modeled here, the outcome of the two should be the same. To see this, recall the four
possible strategies in a buy-price auction from the HWW result stated in section 4.4
above. These are traditional, threshold, conditional and unconditional strategies. Now,
the threshold strategy (under which a bidder waits for the price in the auction to rise
to a certain level before exercising the buy now option), and the conditional strategy
(under which a bidder waits and bids the buy price only if some other bidder bids
above the reserve price) are not available under the rules of eBay auctions, since in
both cases the buy now option would vanish. Therefore, in an eBay buy-price auction,
only two – the standard and the unconditional strategies – are feasible. But this is just
like our selling mechanism. Hence, under the setting of our model, the optimal eBay
auction is to choose the reserve price and the buy price to be v∗ and B respectively, and
in this case the eBay auction should implement the optimal mechanism.
5 CONCLUSION
We study the optimal sellingmechanismwhen similar goods are sold through auctions
as well as posted prices. The starting point of our analysis is the observation that in
addition to traditional posted price selling through “bricks-and-mortar” stores, sellers
can now use the Internet to sell their items through auctions and posted prices. In par-
ticular, lower transactions cost of online trading enables sellers to reach types of buyers
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who are typically priced out in traditional markets. Since the sellers use different sales
mechanisms to sell to different groups of buyers, the optimal design of the overall
mechanism involves second degree price discrimination across selling methods(22).
We attempt to capture this aspect of online pricing in our model. We characterize the
optimal selling mechanism in this environment, and show that it involves a posted
price combined with an auction with “pooling at the top.” Moreover, the allocation
function assumes the maximal value over the pooled region. This feature of the opti-
mal mechanism corresponds exactly with a buy now option. Thus, the phenomenon of
a buy now option in an auction, something that might appear puzzling when seen in
isolation (i.e. in the context of the auction alone) emerges as a necessary feature of the
overall optimal sellingmechanism. Further, we show that posted price selling followed
by a standard auction with a temporary buy now option – used by eBay and seemingly
even more of a puzzling phenomenon(23) – implements the optimal mechanism.
Of course, eBay as well as other online auctions are rich in institutional detail, all of
which we do not claim to capture(24). However, we do believe that for many sellers
online auctions form part of an optimal selling strategy, and therefore it is important
to understand the overall strategy in order to analyze its constituent parts. The main
lesson from our results is that such considerations play a role in understanding how
non-standard auction forms can emerge as an optimal response. While an advantage
of our theory is that it is based on optimal design, further empirical tests taking into
account overall market data are required to distinguish between competing theories.
(22)The ease of eliciting bids from customers has lead to many new and interesting opportunities for
price discrimination on the Internet. Here we have focused on auctions. Another example is the “name
your own price” strategy used by sites such as Priceline to sell airlines tickets, which downgrades the
flexibility of flights (e.g. buyers can name their own price, but flight times are shown after purchase) in
order to sell to lower end customers. See Hall (2001) for a detailed discussion.
(23)As noted in the introduction, this is more puzzling in the sense that even if one could find a reason
for introducing a buy-now option, taking it away as the auction starts begs a further question. Indeed,
as also noted in the introduction, the literature often concludes that auctions with a temporary buy-now
option are revenue inferior to the permanent buy-now counterpart.
(24)For example, one aspect of online auctions is that bidders arrive at random points of time over a
certain interval. Modeling random entry requires a substantially different setup. Here our purpose is
to derive an optimal mechanism that implies a buy now price in a setting as close as possible to the
standard private values model.
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To this end, we briefly mention how the testable implications of our model differ from
other theories.
TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS
The introduction mentions the risk-aversion and sequential auction theories analyzed
in the literature. These theories look at auctions in isolation, and imply that there is no
systematic relation between prices posted elsewhere by the seller for similar goods and
the buy price in the auction. A further implication of the risk aversion theory is that if
similar items are offered for sale through posted prices elsewhere, this might weaken
the incentive to have a buy price, since the most risk averse buyers might prefer to
buy at a posted price. Thus the theory implies that if similar items are sold elsewhere
through posted prices by a seller, this makes it less likely that the seller would use a
buy now option.
The theory presented here, on the other hand, shows that posted price sales make it
more likely that the seller uses a buy price in the auction. Further, our theory predicts
a negative relation between the posted price and the buy price. A higher posted price
necessitates greater inefficiency in the auction to preserve incentives. Further empirical
work is needed to test the relative importance of theories in explaining the emergence
of a buy now option in standard auctions.
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6 APPENDIX: PROOFS
A.1 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
From (3.10), the objective is to maximize∫ v̂
v∗
ψ(v)X(v) f (v)dv +
[
−µ(vh − 1) +
∫ 1
v̂
ψ(v) f (v) dv
]
X(v̂)
For any v ∈ [v∗, v̂), and v′ > v̂, let x(v, v′) = β(v). Thus β(v) is the transfer away from
top types.
For v ∈ [v∗, v̂),
X(v) = F(v) + β(v)(1− F(v̂)). (A.1)
For v ∈ [v̂, 1],
X(v) = F(v∗) +
∫ v̂
v∗
(1− β(t)) f (t) dt +
1− F(v̂)
2
=
1+ F(v̂)
2
−
∫ v̂
v∗
β(t) f (t) dt
For v ∈ [v̂, 1], let X(v) <
1+ F(v̂)
2
, so that the transfer of probability away from top
types is positive. Specifically, let
X(v) = (1− θ)
1+ F(v̂)
2
for v ∈ [v̂, 1] (A.2)
where θ ∈ (0, 1) and fixed exogenously.
Further, incentive compatibility requires
X(v−) ≡ lim
v↑v̂
X(v) 6 (1− θ)1+ F(v̂)
2
(A.3)
Finally, the “probability budget” must be balanced so that
∫ v̂
v∗
β(t) f (t) dt must equal
the total probability transferred away from each type above v̂, given by θ
1+ F(v̂)
2
.
35
Thus ∫ v̂
v∗
β(t) f (t) dt = θ
1+ F(v̂)
2
(A.4)
For any given (v̂, θ), the optimization problem can be written (using equations (A.1)
and (A.2)) as
max
β(v)
∫ v̂
v∗
[F(v) + β(v)(1− F(v̂))] ψ(v) f (v) dv
+
[
−µ(vh − 1) +
∫ 1
v̂
ψ(v) f (v) dv
]
(1− θ)
1+ F(v̂)
2
subject to (A.3) and (A.4).
Given (v̂, θ), the second term is a constant. Thus the optimization problem is simply
given by:
max
β(v)
∫ v̂
v∗
ψ(v)[F(v) + β(v)(1− F(v̂))] f (v)dv
subject to (A.3) and (A.4).
Let us approximate the β(v) function by a step function with n steps at v0 < v1 < . . . <
vn. Let v0 = v∗ and vn = v̂.
Let R̂ denote the maximand. The optimization problem is
max
β1,...,βn
R̂
where
R̂ ≡
∫ v1
v∗
[F(v1) + β1(1− F(v̂))] ψ(v) f (v)dv
+
∫ v2
v1
[F(v2) + β2(1− F(v̂))] ψ(v) f (v)dv
+ . . .+
∫ v̂
vn−1
[F(v̂) + βn(1− F(v̂))] ψ(v) f (v)dv
Subject to
θ
1+ F(v̂)
2
= β1(F(v1)− F(v∗)) + . . .+ βn (F(v̂)− F(vn−1)) (A.5)
We ignore the incentive compatibility constraint (A.3) for the moment - we take this
into account below.
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Let us increase βk and reduce βj in a way such that the constraint is preserved.
From the constraint,
∂βj
∂βk
= −
(
F(vk)− F(vk−1)
F(vj)− F(vj−1)
)
Using this,
dR̂
dβk
= (1− F(v̂)) (F(vk)− F(vk−1)) Z, where
Z =
∫ vk
vk−1
ψ(v)
f (v)
(F(vk)− F(vk−1))
dv−
∫ vj
vj−1
ψ(v)
f (v)
(F(vj)− F(vj−1))
dv
Clearly, Z T 0 as k T j.
Therefore, if constraint (A.3) is slack to start with, it is optimal to increase βn until it
binds, so that
F(v̂) + βn(1− F(v̂)) = (1− θ)
1+ F(v̂)
2
Note that at this point the incentive compatibility constraint (A.3) binds, so that βn
cannot be increased any further. Thus the optimal value of βn is given by
βn =
(1− θ)(1+ F(v̂)/2− F(v̂)
(1− F(v̂))
Next, in the sameway, increase βn−1 until F(vn−1)+ βn−1(1− F(v̂)) = (1− θ)
1+ F(v̂)
2
.
Continuing in this manner, we get ℓ ∈ 1, . . . , n− 1 such that
G(vℓ) > 0 and G(vℓ−1) < 0,
where
G(vℓ) =
n
∑
k=ℓ+1
∫ vk
vk−1
(1− θ)(1+ F(v̂))/2− F(vk)
1− F(v̂)
f (v) dv− θ
1+ F(v̂)
2
Note that the expression on the right hand side simply reflects the constraint (A.5),
with βk replaced by its optimal value for k ∈ {ℓ, . . . , n}.
As we consider a finer and finer grid (i.e. as (vk − vk−1) → 0 for all k), in the limit vℓ is
such that ∫ v̂
vℓ
(1− θ)(1+ F(v̂))/2− F(v)
1− F(v̂)
f (v) dv = θ
1+ F(v̂)
2
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Thus the general form of the optimization problem is given by
max
v̂
∫ vℓ
v∗
F(v)ψ(v) f (v) dv + (1− θ)
1+ F(v̂)
2
∫ v̂
vℓ
ψ(v) f (v) dv
+ (1− θ)
1+ F(v̂)
2
[
−µ(vh − 1) +
∫ 1
v̂
ψ(v) f (v) dv
]
(A.6)
Subject to
∫ v̂
vℓ
(1− θ)(1+ F(v̂))/2− F(v)
1− F(v̂)
f (v) dv = θ
1+ F(v̂)
2
Let
M ≡ (1− θ)
1+ F(v̂)
2
.
Then, from the constraint, we have
∫ v̂
vℓ
(M− F(v)) f (v)dv = (1− F(v̂))
(
1+ F(v̂)
2
−M
)
Which implies
M(F(v̂)− F(vℓ))−
F(v̂)2 − F(vℓ)
2
2
=
1− F(v̂)2
2
− (1− F(v̂))M
Solving, the constraint reduces to
M =
1+ F(vℓ)
2
Using this in (A.6), we can rewrite the optimization problem as the following uncon-
strained maximization problem:
max
vℓ
∫ vℓ
v∗
F(v)ψ(v) f (v) dv +
1+ F(vℓ)
2
[
−µ(vh − 1) +
∫ 1
vℓ
ψ(v) f (v) dv
]
Thus the general form of the maximization problem is as stated. This completes the
proof. h
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A.2 PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Case 1: v 6 v̂.
In stage 2, in equilibrium, the expected payment from bidding v is v∗F(v∗)+
∫ v
v∗
t f (t)dt.
Since
∫ v
v∗
t f (t)dt = vF(v) − v∗F(v∗)−
∫ v
v∗
F(t)dt, the expected payment from bidding
v can be written as
vF(v) −
∫ v
v∗
F(t)dt
The expected value is vF(v). Therefore the expected net payoff from bidding v is∫ v
v∗
F(t)dt. The expected payoff from bidding B is (v− B)
(
F(v̂) +
1− F(v̂)
2
)
.
D(v) denotes the difference between the expected payoff from bidding B in the first
stage or v in the second is. From the above, this is given by
D(v) = (v− B)
(
1+ F(v̂)
2
)
−
∫ v
v∗
F(t)dt
Using the value of B from equation (4.2), this can be rewritten as
D(v) = (v− v̂)
(
1+ F(v̂)
2
)
+
∫ v̂
v
F(t)dt
Clearly, D(v̂) = 0, and D′(v) = 1+F(v̂)2 − F(v) > 0, where the inequality follows from
the fact that v ≤ v̂.
Case 2: v > v̂.
The expected payment from bidding v is v∗F(v∗)+
∫ v̂
v∗
t f (t)dt. This simplifies to v̂F(v̂)−∫ v̂
v∗
F(t)dt. The expected value is vF(v̂). Therefore the expected net payoff is
(v− v̂) F(v̂) +
∫ v̂
v∗
F(t)dt
Hence for types v > v̂,D(v) = (v− B)
(
1+ F(v̂)
2
)
−
(
(v− v̂) F(v̂) +
∫ v̂
v∗
F(t)dt
)
. Us-
ing the value of B from equation (4.2), this can be rewritten as D(v) = (v− v̂)
(
1−F(v̂)
2
)
.
Clearly, D(v̂) = 0, and D′(v) =
1− F(v̂)
2
> 0. h
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